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In 2005, an essay was published in Nature asserting that the universe is mental and that we 
must abandon our tendency to conceptualize observations as things. Since then, experiments have 
confi rmed that — as predicted by quantum mechanics — reality is contextual, which contradicts at 
least intuitive formulations of realism and corroborates the hypothesis of a mental universe. Yet, to 
give this hypothesis a coherent rendering, one must explain how a mental universe can — at least in 
principle — accommodate (a) our experience of ourselves as distinct individual minds sharing a world 
beyond the control of our volition; and (b) the empirical fact that this world is contextual despite being 
seemingly shared. By combining a modern formulation of the ontology of idealism with the relational 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, the present paper attempts to provide a viable explanatory 
framework for both points. In the process of doing so, the paper also addresses key philosophical 
qualms of the relational interpretation.
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Introduction
The recent loophole-free veriﬁ cation of Bell’s inequalities [Hensen et al., 2015] has shown 
that no theory based on the joint assumptions of realism and locality is tenable. This already 
restricts the viability of realism — the view that there is an objective physical world; that 
is, a world (a) ontologically distinct from mentation that (b) exists independently of being 
observed — to nonlocal hidden-variables theories. More speciﬁ cally, other recent experiments 
have shown that the physical world is contextual: its measurable physical properties do not 
exist before being observed [Grö blacher et al., 2007; Lapkiewicz et al., 2011; Manning et al., 
2015]. Contextuality is a formidable challenge to the viability of realism.
These developments seem to corroborate Richard Conn Henry’s assertion in his 2005 
Nature essay that “The Universe is entirely mental” [Henry, 2005: 29]. After all, in a mental 
universe (a) observation necessarily boils down to perceptual experience — what else? — 
and (b) the physical properties of the world exist only insofar as they are perceptually 
experienced. There is no ontological ground outside mind where these properties could 
otherwise reside before being represented in mind. Indeed, in a mental universe observation 
is the physical world — not merely a representation of the world — which not only echoes 
but makes sense of contextuality.
Realism, on the other hand — at least in its intuitive formulations — entails that the world 
should have objective physical properties; that is, properties ontologically distinct from 
mentation, which exist even without being observed. Accurate observation should simply 
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reveal what the objective physical properties of the world already were immediately prior to 
being observed, which is contradicted by contextuality.
There have been attempts to preserve some form of realism by ﬁ nding a subset of 
physical properties whose values can be determined in a non-contextual manner under certain 
circumstances. The idea is then to claim that this subset is the objective physical world. For 
instance, Philippe Grangier [Grangier, 2001], inspired by Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen’s view 
of what constitutes physical objectivity, contends that the quantum state of a system, deﬁ ned 
“by the values of a set of physical quantities, which can be predicted with certainty and 
measured repeatedly without perturbing in any way the system,” [Grangier, 2001: 1] is an 
objective physical entity.
The problem with this approach is highlighted by Grangier himself: the “deﬁ nition [of 
the quantum state] is inferred from observations which are made at the macroscopic level” 
[Grangier, 2001: 2]. In other words, the supposedly physically objective quantum state of a 
system depends on the a priori existence of a physically objective classical world surrounding 
the system. This begs the question of physical objectivity instead of rendering it viable under 
contextuality. Because “a quantum state ‘involving the environment’ cannot be consistently 
deﬁ ned” [Grangier, 2001: 4], Grangier’s approach fails to reconcile contextuality with a 
supposedly physically objective world.
Some nonlocal hidden variables theories that preserve non-intuitive forms of realism — 
such as perhaps Bohm’s [Bohm, 1952a; Bohm, 1952b] — may still be reconcilable with 
contextuality. However, these theories postulate — often at the cost of mathematical 
acrobatics — extra theoretical entities that are both empirically ungrounded and unnecessary 
for predictive purposes.
Carlo Rovelli’s relational interpretation [Rovelli, 2008], on the other hand, sticks to plain 
quantum theory and embraces contextuality. Instead of loading it with unnecessary baggage, 
it simply interprets what quantum theory tells us about the world and bites the bullet of its 
implications. Rovelli’s goal “is not to modify quantum mechanics to make it consistent with 
[his] view of the world, but to modify [his] view of the world to make it consistent with 
quantum mechanics” [Rovelli, 2008: 16].
In the remainder of this paper, I shall take the relational interpretation as my working 
hypothesis. My motivation for doing so is three-fold: (a) the interpretation is consistent with 
experimentally-veriﬁ ed contextuality; (b) it is parsimonious in that it does not postulate 
predictively-redundant hidden variables; and (c) Rovelli’s case for why other approaches are 
inferior to the relational interpretation is compelling [Rovelli, 2008: 16-19].
By embracing contextuality, the relational interpretation regards every property of the 
physical world as relative to the observer. This is analogous to how the speed of a particle 
with mass is always relative to its observer. There are no absolute physical quantities, but 
simply a set of relational properties that comes into existence depending on the context of 
observation. Rovelli summarizes it thus:
If diﬀ erent observers give diﬀ erent accounts of the same sequence of events, then each 
quantum mechanical description has to be understood as relative to a particular observer. 
Thus, a quantum mechanical description of a certain system (state and/or values of physical 
quantities) cannot be taken as an “absolute” (observer independent) description of reality, 
but rather as a formalization, or codiﬁ cation, of properties of a system relative to a given 
observer. Quantum mechanics can therefore be viewed as a theory about the states of 
systems and values of physical quantities relative to other systems [Rovelli, 2008: 6].
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Like the Copenhagen interpretation, the relational interpretation entails that (a) physical 
quantities are products of observation. But most signiﬁ cantly, it goes further than Copenhagen 
by asserting that (b) the world is relational: an observation does not create a world shared by 
everyone, but just the world of that particular observer.
This diﬀ erence with respect to the Copenhagen interpretation is not trivial. After all, it is 
implausible but conceivable that observation could create an objective physical world shared 
by all observers. For instance, if never observed, the spin of an electron may lack physical 
objectivity. But its fi rst observation would then, ex hypothesi, determine its physical value for 
all subsequent observers. The physical objectivity of this value — and thus of the world — 
could be inferred from consensus among these observers. Such a hypothesis is consistent 
with assertion (a) above but not (b).
It is also conceivable that each of us could be living alone in an objective physical world — 
that is, a world ontologically distinct and independent from our mentation — peculiar to 
ourselves. The physical objectivity of such a world could be inferred from non-contextuality 
veriﬁ ed by experiment. Such a hypothesis is consistent with assertion (b) above but not (a).
By combining assertions (a) and (b), the relational interpretation renders realism — the 
notion that there is an objective physical world — meaningless. After all, in the absence of 
consensus and non-contextuality, on the basis of what could we speak of physical objectivity? 
What meaning would the latter have? According to the relational interpretation, the world 
exists only insofar as the information associated with an observer is concerned.
Rovelli seeks to avoid ontological conjectures. Yet, the denial of realism seems to be a 
direct implication of the relational interpretation. In fact, it is only one among a handful of 
philosophical issues Rovelli admittedly leaves unaddressed: “I am aware of the ‘philosophical 
qualm’ that the ideas presented here may … generate,” he writes. “I certainly do not want 
to venture into philosophical terrains, and I leave this aspect of the discussion to competent 
thinkers” [Rovelli, 2008: 19].
It is these philosophical qualms that the present paper attempts to tackle, without 
contradicting the relational interpretation. In doing so, it articulates a mind-only idealist 
framework consistent with contextuality and — contradictory as this may at ﬁ rst sound — 
our intuition that we are individual beings sharing experiences with each other.
First Qualm: The Intuition of a Shared World
The relational interpretation denies that we can all inhabit the same objective physical 
world. It implies instead that each of us — as diﬀ erent observers — lives alone in our own 
private physical world, created according to the context of our own private observations. 
Insofar as this resembles metaphysical solipsism, it may be philosophically problematic. 
However, there still is a way to uphold our intuition that there is a consensus reality we share 
with other people.
It is true that, according to the relational interpretation, observation is not a measurement 
of or in a shared physical world, but the process that brings a unique physical world into 
existence in relation to each particular observer. This way, there are as many physical worlds 
as there are observers. A way to visualize this is to imagine that each person sits alone in a car 
corresponding to his or her own physical world. No two people can ever sit in the same car. 
Any ontology that contradicts this is inconsistent with the relational interpretation.
However, we can still ask another question: Can the physical worlds of diﬀ erent observers 
be consistent with, and similar to, each other? Notice that this does not deny that diﬀ erent 
observers have their own physical worlds; it simply asks whether these distinct worlds can 
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be similar or mutually consistent. In other words, the question is whether we could all be 
sitting in cars of the same make, model and year; cars that, although distinct, are nearly 
indistinguishable from each other. If so, we would each describe our own cars in a way 
consistent with all other descriptions.
Here is what the relational interpretation has to say about this: nothing precludes the 
possibility of the physical worlds of diﬀ erent observers being similar or mutually consistent. 
However, it is fundamentally impossible to assert that they are so, for “the information 
possessed by distinct observers cannot be compared directly” [Rovelli, 2008: 14]. The 
rationale here is as follows: the notion of a consensus physical reality emerges from inter-
personal communication. If I stand on a beach watching the waves and the person next to me 
also reports seeing waves, it is this inter-personal communication that leads me to believe 
that I and the other person experience the same beach. However, what I hear the other person 
say is itself the result of my observation, which brings the other person’s report into existence 
in relation to me. As such, the other person’s report is itself part of my physical world as 
a particular observer; it has no absolute existence. For all I know, the physical worlds 
experienced by other people — as distinct observers who bring distinct physical worlds into 
existence — may be entirely diﬀ erent from mine. The consensus I believe to exist about 
external reality may itself be an element peculiar to my physical world, my car. Everybody is 
an observer locked in his or her own car. There is no privileged referee who could walk from 
car to car, collect and compare the descriptions of each car, and then verify whether there 
actually is a consensus.
All this said, the intuition of a consensus external reality is so strong that we must 
ask: Can there be an ontological underpinning for the relational interpretation whereby 
the respective physical worlds of diﬀ erent observers are at least expected to be similar or 
mutually consistent? In other words, can an ontology provide us good reasons to believe — 
even though we fundamentally could never verify it — that the physical worlds of diﬀ erent 
observers should look alike? The motivation for this question is admittedly subjective, but 
the exact same subjective motivation has been enough to marginalize metaphysical solipsism 
throughout the history of philosophy. Indeed, Bertrand Russell’s argument against solipsism 
seems to be applicable here: the idea that we might each be alone in an idiosyncratic world of 
our own “is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who 
mean to accept it” [Russell, 2009: 161].
I shall shortly attempt to articulate an idealist framework for the relational interpretation 
according to which similarity or consistency across physical worlds is the natural and 
expected case, even though it cannot be veriﬁ ed. This framework is meant to acknowledge 
and assuage the intuition that we share the experiences of life with other people, whilst 
upholding contextuality.
Second Qualm: The Ontological Ground of Information
The relational interpretation relies on Shannon’s concept of information: “A complete 
description of the world is exhausted by the relevant information that systems have about 
each other” [Rovelli, 2008: 7] (emphasis added). Although Rovelli avoids explicit ontological 
commitments, his appeal to information according to Shannon’s deﬁ nition [Shannon, 1948] 
implies one such commitment. After all, Shannon deﬁ nes information as a measure of the 
number of states discernible in a system. As such, information is an abstraction associated 
with the possible confi gurations of a system, not a thing unto itself (unless, of course, one is 
prepared to venture into the abstraction wilderness of ontic pancomputationalism [Fredkin, 
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2003; Tegmark, 2014]). Hence, insofar as it relies on (Shannon) information, the relational 
interpretation requires either a realist world — wherein information is grounded in the 
discernible states of objective physical arrangements — or an idealist world — wherein 
information is associated with the discernible qualities of experience. And since realism is 
meaningless under the relational interpretation, idealism seems to be implied by it.
However, idealism faces some challenges. In another work [Kastrup, 2017], I have 
addressed and hopefully refuted common objections to it. In this paper, two challenges will be 
more thoroughly looked at: If mind extends into the world itself, grounding it ontologically, 
why can we not mentally control or at least inﬂ uence the laws of physics? Moreover, if all 
reality is mental, then there is no non-mental stuﬀ  to insulate diﬀ erent individual minds 
from one another. Why, then, can we not directly access each other’s thoughts? Satisfactorily 
answering these challenges is another key objective of the idealist framework I shall attempt 
to articulate shortly. If successful, the articulation will render idealism a viable ontological 
underpinning for the notion of (Shannon) information intrinsic to the relational interpretation.
Third Qualm: Relationships without Absolutes
The central idea of the relational interpretation is the notion that “physics is fully relational, 
not just as far as the notions of rest and motion are considered, but with respect to all physical 
quantities” [Rovelli, 2008: 7] (emphasis added). The problem here is that the analogy with 
rest and motion, albeit intuitively appealing, breaks when applied to “all physical quantities.”
Indeed, the relational nature of rest and motion depends on certain posited absolutes, such 
as deﬁ ned particles. To say, for instance, that the speed of a particle A is one with respect 
to particle B and another with respect to particle C is conditioned upon the existence of 
particles A, B and C as non-relational entities. Rest and motion have meaning only insofar 
as they are relationships between absolutes. But if all physical quantities are to be regarded 
as relational, what absolutes give these relationships meaning? To speak of relationships 
between relationships immediately implies inﬁ nite regress.
Let us take a step back. What the relational interpretation actually requires is that all 
physical quantities be relational. As such, it would only imply inﬁ nite regress if physical 
quantities were all there is. On the other hand, if an ontological underpinning for the relational 
interpretation could accommodate absolutes that are not physical quantities, inﬁ nite regress 
could be avoided. This is what the idealist framework ahead also does, as I shall soon 
elaborate upon.
Notice that, although positing absolutes that are not physical quantities is necessarily 
a metaphysical step, it is not empirically ungrounded. There is an empirically-accessible 
ontological ground where absolutes can be found that are not — unless assumed or, at best, 
inferred to be so on philosophical grounds — physical quantities: mind and its thoughts. I 
shall elaborate further on this claim shortly.
Fourth Qualm: The Meaning of ‘Physical World’
When we speak of a ‘physical world’ we often make implicit ontological assumptions 
about it, such as non-contextuality and realism. However, as we have seen, these assumptions 
are stripped oﬀ  by the relational interpretation. So what does ‘physical world’ mean under it?
The clarity of thought of Andrei Linde comes to our aid at this point:
Let us remember that our knowledge of the world begins not with matter but with 
perceptions. … Later we ﬁ nd out that our perceptions obey some laws, which can be 
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most conveniently formulated if we assume that there is some underlying reality beyond 
our perceptions. This model of material world obeying laws of physics is so successful 
that soon we forget about our starting point and say that matter is the only reality, and 
perceptions are only helpful for its description. This assumption is almost as natural (and 
maybe as false) as our previous assumption that space is only a mathematical tool for the 
description of matter. [Linde, 1998: 12]
So, in the absence of non-contextuality and realism, the ‘physical world’ of the relational 
interpretation can only be the contents of perception. There is nothing else the physical world 
could be. Indeed, as Linde pointed out, physics ultimately pertains to the study of the patterns 
and regularities of perception. As such, the “physical quantities” referred to by Rovelli are 
part of the contents of perception.
It could be argued at this point that quantum phenomena occur at a microscopic scale 
that cannot be perceived directly, but only through instrumentation. Yet, even in this case, 
whatever we know about these microscopic quantum phenomena is still a part of the contents 
of perception: physicists perceive the output of instrumentation. When predicting microscopic 
quantum behavior, physicists are in fact predicting the perceivable output of instrumentation. 
Physics is entirely about what is perceived, directly or indirectly.
We know that next to the physical world — that is, next to the contents of perception — there 
are also non-perceptual mental categories such as thoughts (for simplicity, I shall henceforth 
refer to all non-perceptual mental categories simply as ‘thoughts’). Many physicists posit that 
thoughts should be explainable in terms of physical quantities and, as such, become part of 
the physical world by reduction. However, this is a philosophical assumption that does not 
change the scientiﬁ c fact that quantum mechanics does not predict thoughts; it only predicts 
the unfolding of perception. In the absence of non-contextuality and realism, the physical 
world of quantum mechanics is perception.
Attentive readers will have noticed that I have just opened a door for tackling the third 
qualm of the relational interpretation, as discussed in the previous section. More on this 
shortly.
Fifth Qualm: The Meaning of ‘Physical System’
Under the relational interpretation, all “physical systems” are valid observers and can, in 
turn, also be observed [Rovelli, 2008: 4]. This neutrality is a strength, for it circumvents a 
host of issues regarding what constitutes an observer. Yet, the same neutrality disguises the 
fact that a deeper question is left unanswered: What constitutes a physical system to begin 
with? From a philosophical perspective, the answer is not self-evident.
The intuition behind what we ordinarily regard as discrete physical systems — such as 
tabletop measurement apparatuses — entails (a) delineating a subset of the physical world 
on structural or functional grounds and (b) treating this subset as an entity in some sense 
separate from the rest of the physical world. The question is whether such delineation is ontic 
or epistemic.
If the delineation merely helps us structure our conceptual knowledge of the physical 
world, it is epistemic and — despite being convenient — arbitrary on an ontic level. For 
instance, although the handle of a mug is cognitively salient and can be conveniently 
treated as a separate entity, distinguishing it from the mug is arbitrary. Another example: 
the delineation of what we call a car, though based on structural and functional reasoning, 
is arbitrary. If I argue that, say, the spark plugs are integral to the car because without them 
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the car cannot function, by the same token I would also have to include the fuel that makes 
its engine run, the environment air that allows combustion and cools the engine, the road 
gripped by the tires, the ground that sustains the road, the gravity that enables grip, and 
so on. The decision of where to stop is merely epistemic, motivated by convenience. As 
such, epistemic delineation is somewhat akin to ﬁ nding faces in clouds or tracing ﬁ gures 
on tree bark. Subsets of the physical world traced in this manner exist only conceptually 
and, therefore, cannot be considered proper physical systems in their own merit. There is no 
physical reason to carve them out of the context within which they were traced.
A proper physical system must be an internally integrated whole separate, in some ontic 
sense, from the rest of the physical world. The problem is that there are strong reasons — 
largely based on quantum mechanics itself — to think that the entire universe is one integrated 
whole without ultimate parts. Jonathan Schaﬀ er, for instance, points out that
physically, there is good evidence that the cosmos forms an entangled system and good 
reason to treat entangled systems as irreducible wholes. Modally, mereology allows for 
the possibility of atomless gunk, with no ultimate parts for the pluralist to invoke as the 
ground of being. [Schaﬀ er, 2010: 32] (original emphasis)
Horgan and Potrč [Horgan & Potrč, 2000] have also argued that only the universe as a 
whole can be considered a concrete entity in its own merit, which they called the “blobject.” 
Thus, only the “blobject” can be a proper physical system.
What this line of thought suggests is that no subset of the physical world can be 
considered a proper physical system; only the physical world as a whole can. Everything we 
regard as subsystems of the physical world — such as tabletop measurement apparatuses — 
arises from epistemic delineation and is, in a sense, akin to ﬁ gures traced on tree bark. The 
physical substantiation of this conclusion is von Neumann’s chains [von Neumann, 1996]: 
‘subsystems’ of the inanimate world never perform measurements, but simply become 
entangled with each other upon interacting.
If only the universe as a whole were a proper physical system, observer and observed 
would be the same system, leading to untreatable self-reference. But I contend that there 
is precisely one criterion of delineation that is not arbitrary, and by virtue of which we can 
ontologically ground observer and observed without self-reference. I shall discuss this in the 
next section, wherein I begin to elaborate on my proposed idealist framework.
Mind and Alters
Here is a brief recapitulation of the preceding sections: (a) the relational interpretation 
renders the notion of realism meaningless. Therefore, (b) it implies idealism insofar as it relies 
on (Shannon) information, and (c) it implicitly deﬁ nes the physical world as the contents of 
perception. However, it then raises problems such as (d) why we cannot mentally inﬂ uence 
the laws of nature if mind extends into the physical world, (e) how distinct individual minds 
can exist in a fully mental universe, (f) what constitutes a proper physical system, and (g) 
how relationships can exist without absolutes to give them meaning and avoid inﬁ nite 
regress. Despite its relational character, the interpretation still (h) leaves a door open for 
the intuitively appealing possibility of similar or mutually consistent physical worlds across 
observers.
From (b), the most direct and parsimonious ontological underpinning for the relational 
interpretation is that reality consists in patterns of excitation of a universal mind. This is 
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analogous to how quantum ﬁ eld theory posits that reality consists of patterns of excitation 
of a quantum ﬁ eld and M-theory those of a hyper-dimensional ‘brane.’ The universal mind 
could, in principle, even accommodate the same mathematical formalisms of these theories. 
The main diﬀ erence is that, unlike the quantum ﬁ eld and the hyper-dimensional ‘brane,’ the 
universal mind is not an object but the subject. Its excitations are thus experiences — not 
objective physical values — though they can still be modeled or described mathematically 
by values.
Let me dwell a little longer on this move, for it is profoundly counterintuitive to 
most physicists and even philosophers. Every theory of nature must rely on at least one 
ontological primitive, since we cannot keep on explaining one thing in terms of another 
forever. According to quantum ﬁ eld theory, the quantum ﬁ eld is the ontological primitive, so 
everything about the physical world should be reducible to excitations of the quantum ﬁ eld. 
What I am proposing here is that universal mind is the ontological primitive. An alternative 
but equivalent way of saying the same thing is to say that the quantum ﬁ eld is mind; that is, 
the subject, not an abstract conceptual object. Inferring universal mind — not your or my 
personal psyche, mind you, but mind as a generic ontological class — to be nature’s sole 
ontological primitive is thus a valid conjecture, at least in principle. It is equally valid to think 
of the dynamics of nature as being constituted by the excitations of universal mind — that 
is, experiences themselves, with all the entailed qualities — much as quantum ﬁ eld theory 
thinks of the dynamics of nature as excitations of an abstract quantum ﬁ eld and M-theory 
those of an abstract brane. The challenge, of course, is to explain the patterns and regularities 
of nature in terms of subjectivity alone.
Indeed, the idea that a universal mind is nature’s single ontological primitive immediately 
brings problem (e) to the forefront. As it turns out, the solution of this problem is the same as 
that of problem (f), so I will start my argument by addressing the latter.
Rovelli “assume[s] that the world can be decomposed (possibly in a variety of ways) in a 
collection of systems, each of which can be equivalently considered as an observing system 
or as an observed system” [Rovelli, 2008: 10]. The problem, as we have seen in the previous 
section, is that the criteria for this decomposition seem arbitrary both from ontic and physical 
perspectives.
There is, however, one very natural ontic decomposition. To see it, notice that the 
boundaries of our own body are not arbitrary. Our ability to perceive ends at the surface of 
the body: our skin, retinas, eardrums, tongue and the mucous lining of our nose. We cannot 
perceive photons hitting a wall or air pressure oscillations bouncing oﬀ  a window, but we can 
perceive those impinging on our retinas and eardrums, respectively. Moreover, our ability to 
act through direct intention also ends at the surface of the body: we can move our arms and 
legs simply by intending to move them. However, we cannot do the same with tables and 
chairs. Clearly, thus, the delineation of our body is not a question of epistemic convenience: 
it is an empirical fact. I cannot just decide that the chair I am sitting on is integral to my body, 
in the way that I can decide that the handle is integral to the mug. Neither can I decide that 
a patch of my skin is not integral to my body, in the way that I can decide that the hood is 
not integral to the jacket. The criterion here is not merely a functional or structural one, but 
the range of mentation — sensory perception, intention — intrinsically associated with our 
body. Based on this ontic criterion, there is no epistemic freedom to move boundaries at will.
Insofar as we can assume that all living creatures have mental life and inanimate objects 
do not, this conclusion can be generalized as follows: living bodies are proper physical 
systems; they can be carved out of their context. Therefore, only the inanimate universe as a 
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whole — that is, one universal von Neumann chain — and individual living bodies are proper 
physical systems; only the inanimate universe and living bodies are observers. Everything 
else is akin to ﬁ gures traced on tree bark.
Now, since the ontic criterion for delineating bodies is the range of mentation associated 
with them, each proper physical system is associated with its own bounded mentation. Yet, 
how can bounded mentation exist within one universal mind?
The answer is empirically motivated: it is now well-established in psychiatry that mental 
contents can become dissociated [Kelly et al, 2009: 167-174; Schlumpf et al., 2014; Strasburger 
& Waldvogel, 2015]; that is, undergo “a disruption of and/or discontinuity in [their] normal 
integration” [Black & Grant, 2014: 191]. Indeed, the normal integration of mental contents 
takes place through chains of cognitive associations: a perception may evoke an abstract 
idea, which may trigger a memory, which may inspire a thought, etc. These associations are 
logical, in the sense that e.g. the memory inspires the thought because of a certain implicit 
logic linking the two. Integrated mentation can then be modeled by a connected directed graph, 
as shown in Figure 1a. Each vertex represents a particular mental content and each edge a 
cognitive association logically linking mental contents together. Every mental content in the 
graph of Figure 1a can be reached from any other mental content through a chain of cognitive 
associations. Dissociation, in turn, occurs when the graph becomes disconnected, as shown in 
Figure 1b. Some mental contents can then no longer be reached from others. Following the 
psychiatric convention, I shall refer to the subgraph with grey vertices as a (dissociated) alter.
Figure 1. A connected graph (a) illustrating integration of mental contents, and a disconnected 
graph (b) illustrating dissociation and the corresponding formation of an alter (subgraph in grey).
Because cognitive associations are essentially logical, as opposed to spatio-temporal, the 
scheme of representation in Figure 1 allows for the simultaneous experience of multiple mental 
contents linked together in a connected subgraph. This is empirically justiﬁ able: a perception, for 
instance, can be experienced at the same time as the thoughts it evokes and the emotions evoked 
by these thoughts. Moreover — and by the same token — the two disconnected subgraphs in 
Figure 1b can also represent two concurrently conscious dissociated subjects of experience. 
The motivation for this is again empirical: there is compelling evidence that diﬀ erent alters of 
the same psyche can be co-conscious [Kelly et al., 2009: 317-322; Braude, 1995: 67-68].
An alter loses direct access to mental contents surrounding it, but remains integral to 
the mind that hosts it. The disconnection between an alter and surrounding mental contents 
is merely logical. As an analogy, a database may contain entries that are not indexed and, 
therefore, cannot be reached, but this does not physically separate those entries from the rest 
of the database.
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Dissociation elegantly explains how mental processes can become bounded and 
disconnected from each other without the need to invoke anything ontologically distinct from 
mind. As such, dissociation is at least a useful analogy to explain how distinct individual 
psyches can form under idealism: each is an alter of universal mind. A living body is simply 
the extrinsic appearance of an alter (more on this shortly). Dissociation thus solves not only 
problem (e), but also (d): we, as alters of universal mind, cannot mentally inﬂ uence the laws 
of nature because we are dissociated — logically disconnected — from the corresponding 
mental contents.
At this point, the reader may feel tempted to explain away dissociation in terms of 
information ﬂ ows in physically objective brain tissue. Notice, however, that this would 
assume realism and beg the very question of ontology being addressed here. The hypothesis 
I am just beginning to elaborate on is precisely that dissociation — as a phenomenon that 
precedes the physical world ontologically — can explain the physical world, as opposed to 
the other way around. This is somewhat analogous to saying, under quantum ﬁ eld theory, for 
instance, that certain fundamental excitatory phenomena of the quantum ﬁ eld give rise to the 
physical world we can measure. So please bear with me.
Mental Impingement across a Dissociative Boundary
By deﬁ nition, mental contents inside an alter cannot directly evoke mental contents 
outside the alter, and vice-versa. But they can still infl uence each other. Indeed, mental 
impingement across a dissociative boundary is empirically known. Lynch and Kilmartin, 
for instance, report that dissociated feelings can dramatically aﬀ ect our thoughts [Lynch & 
Kilmartin, 2013: 100], while Eagleman shows that dissociated expectations routinely mold 
our perceptions [Eagleman, 2011: 20-54]. We can visualize this as in Figure 2a, wherein the 
partial overlap of adjacent vertices internal and external to the alter represents impingement 
across the dissociative boundary.
Figure 2b illustrates the same thing according to a simpliﬁ ed representation unrelated 
to graph theory: the broader mind is represented as a white circle with an alter represented 
as a grey circle within it. These circles are no longer graph vertices but represent sets of 
mental contents. The dashed arrows represent the impingement of external and internal 
mental contents — not explicitly shown — on each other, across the alter’s boundary. For 
clarity, notice that these dashed arrows do not represent cognitive associations. I shall use this 
simpliﬁ ed representation henceforth.
Figure 2. Mental contents impinging on the dissociative boundary of an alter, illustrated in two 
diﬀ erent but equivalent ways, (a) and (b).
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A Physical World as Markov Blanket
If — as idealism posits — a universal mind is the single ontological primitive underlying 
all nature, then the formation of an alter deﬁ nes a boundary within this mind that separates 
mental contents enclosed by the boundary from mental contents outside the boundary. Now, 
as we have seen in the previous section, certain mental contents within and outside the 
boundary can also impinge on each other (Figure 2). Three diﬀ erent types of mental state 
can then be deﬁ ned with respect to an alter: internal, external and interactive state, the latter 
resulting from impingement. The boundary of an alter is thus akin to a Markov Blanket [Pearl, 
1988]. For this reason, and inspired by Friston’s model [Friston, 2013], I shall represent the 
interaction of an alter with its surrounding mental environment as illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3. An alter — with internal mental state r — interacting with the surrounding environment — 
with external mental state ψ — through the sensory (s) and active (a) states of its Markov Blanket.
I shall refer to the segment of universal mind that is not comprised in any alter as ‘mind-
at-large.’ Therefore, the state ψ of mind-at-large is external to all alters. An alter, in turn, has 
internal state r and interacts with mind-at-large through sensory state s and active state a, 
both comprised in its Markov Blanket. Sensory state s represents the (Shannon) information 
the alter has about its surrounding mental environment. Active state a represents the alter’s 
manifest intent: mental action that perturbs the environment. Notice that ‘environment’ here 
does not refer to the physical world, but to non-physical thoughts surrounding the alter. I shall 
further clarify this shortly.
Sensory state s depends on external state ψ and action state a. The dependency of s on 
a, however, is both indirect — operating through the inﬂ uence of a on ψ — and direct, as 
shown in Figure 3. The direct dependency represents the quantum mechanical fact that the 
information an alter — as observer — has about its surrounding environment depends both 
on the environment itself (ψ) and on how the alter’s manifest intent (a) causes it to observe 
the environment. The classical example is the experimentally conﬁ rmed fact that even whole 
atoms behave either as waves or as particles depending on how the experimenter chooses to 
observe them [Manning et al., 2015].
The double dependency of sensory state s on active state a can be justiﬁ ed as follows: 
on the one hand, the manifest intent a of an alter perturbs — through mental impingement 
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across its dissociative boundary, as illustrated in Figure 2b — the state ψ of mind-at-large 
itself. On the other hand, the manifest intent a also determines the speciﬁ c ‘vantage point’ the 
alter has on mind-at-large and, therefore, what information the alter gathers about it. As an 
analogy, when one holds up a snow globe, this intentional action not only perturbs the state 
of the snow globe itself, but also determines the vantage point from which one looks at the 
snow globe.
The active state a depends on internal state r and sensory state s. The dependency of a on 
s is again both indirect — operating through the inﬂ uence of s on r — and direct, as shown 
in Figure 3. A simple analogy justiﬁ es this double dependency: an alter’s manifest intent 
depends both on the information the alter has about the environment (s) and on what the alter 
thinks about this information (r).
External state ψ and internal state r are thoughts of mind-at-large and an alter, respectively. 
I submit that quantum superposition states are models of these thoughts, the evolution of 
the latter being governed by Schrödinger’s equation. To gain intuition about this, imagine 
the following: you have received a job oﬀ er but remain undecided about whether to accept 
it or not. Your thoughts then remain in a form of superposition, encompassing two binary 
alternatives simultaneously: accepting and refusing the oﬀ er. Each alternative is associated 
with the degree of aﬃ  nity you have with it — which translates into your tendency to choose 
it — at that particular moment in time. I posit that a quantum superposition is simply a 
second-person model of this type of ambivalent mental state that we all experience from a 
ﬁ rst-person perspective. External state ψ is a model of what it is like to be mind-at-large in 
the process of entertaining conﬂ icting alternatives concurrently in its imagination. As such, 
the wave function of ψ does represent epistemic uncertainty; but — crucially — the epistemic 
uncertainty of mind-at-large itself, not of the alter observing it.
I further posit that the process of observation consists in the interaction between external 
state ψ and internal state r through the Markov Blanket. In this context, it is tempting to 
simply say that active state a represents the intentional act of observation and sensory state 
s the outcome of this act. However, as discussed above and illustrated in Figure 3, a and 
s are co-dependent and cannot be teased apart. So a better way to think about the process 
of observation may be suggested by the following analogy: insofar as ψ and r can both be 
modeled by a wave function, they can be regarded as thought waves encompassing a set of 
binary alternatives with associated degrees of aﬃ  nity, just as discussed in the example of 
a job oﬀ er above. Observation can then be modeled as the interference pattern — whose 
compound state is represented in Figure 3 by s and a — produced when these thought waves 
interact with each other within the Markov Blanket. Interference favors one of every pair of 
superposed alternatives in ψ by amplifying its experience while dampening the other. The 
result is our perception of a deﬁ nite, classical world. The alternative favored can be regarded 
as the common denominator of the aﬃ  nities embedded in ψ and r.
The interpretation suggested above shall remain a matter of philosophical speculation 
until somebody writes down the wave function for the thoughts of a conscious human being 
(r) and formalizes the interaction dynamics between it and ψ. This echoes Zurek’s view that
an exhaustive answer to [the question of why we perceive a deﬁ nite world] would 
undoubtedly have to involve a model of “consciousness,” since what we are really 
asking concerns our (observers) impression that “we are conscious” of just one of the 
alternatives. Such model of consciousness is presently not available [Zurek, 1994: 29] 
(emphasis added).
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Whatever the case, under the relational interpretation — as discussed earlier — the 
physical world is perception. Therefore, it is determined by sensory state s, which in turn 
is co-dependent on active state a. The next step in this line of reasoning is inevitable: the 
physical world is the Markov Blanket. Everything else — that is, ψ and r — is non-physical 
thought. It is the interaction between ψ and r that produces perception and, thus, the physical 
world. Only states s and a of the Markov Blanket are physical states, for only they are 
comprised in the physical world.
Since all states in Figure 3 are ultimately patterns of excitation of universal mind, physical 
states represent but a particular class of mental states: namely, perceptual states. Another 
class is exempliﬁ ed by states ψ and r, which consist of pure thought. So, while discernible 
from each other qualitatively, both physical and non-physical states are ultimately mental.
Extrinsic Appearances
Figure 3 can be extended to multiple alters, as illustrated in Figure 4. The interaction 
between ψ and the internal state r of each alter creates the physical world of this alter in 
the form of its respective Markov Blanket encompassing sensory state s and active state 
a. Therefore, each alter has its own physical world. The wave function of ψ also becomes 
quantum mechanically correlated, upon interaction, with the active state a of each alter. 
This way, ψ accrues (Shannon) information about the presence and behavior of all alters 
interacting with mind-at-large.
This has a signiﬁ cant implication. When an alter A
1
 interacts — through mental 
impingement across its dissociative boundary — with mind-at-large, ψ becomes quantum 
mechanically correlated with active state a1 of A1. Therefore, when an alter A2 subsequently 
interacts with mind-at-large, the information its sensory state s2 acquires can include 
information about A
1
. The physical world of A
2
 can thus reﬂ ect the presence and actions of 
A
1
. I shall refer to the information about A
1
 in s2 as A1’s extrinsic appearance in relation to A2.
For reasons discussed earlier, I posit that the extrinsic appearances of other alters in relation 
to us are the living bodies we perceive around ourselves: other people, animals, possibly plants. 
As such, biology is what betrays elements of our world as extrinsic appearances of other alters.
Figure 4. Mind-at-large and alters. When an alter interacts with mind-at-large, ψ becomes quantum 
mechanically correlated with the alter’s active state a, so that each alter can indirectly obtain information 
about all other alters through its sensory state s.
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This notion of extrinsic appearances can be extended to mind-at-large itself: the 
inanimate universe is the extrinsic appearance of mind-at-large in relation to us. That there is 
overwhelming evidence for the existence of the universe before the rise of life means solely 
that the universal mind existed before its ﬁ rst alter ever formed; that is, before abiogenesis.
The extrinsic appearances of other alters in relation to us are part of our respective physical 
world. They constitute proper physical systems within our Markov Blanket. Therefore, 
only living beings and the inanimate universe as a whole constitute observers. All other 
subsystems of the inanimate universe — such as tabletop measurement apparatuses — are 
only subsets of ‘pixels’ integral to mind-at-large’s extrinsic appearance. There is no more 
reason to carve them out as separate subsystems in their own merit than there is reason to 
carve out the subset of reddish pixels of a photograph and treat it as a thing in its own merit.
At this point, it is important to notice that the external state ψ of mind-at-large and the 
internal state r of each alter do not have spatio-temporal extension, for they are not physical. 
Their seemingly spatial representation in Figure 4 is simply an artifact of depiction. Space is 
conﬁ ned to Markov Blankets. Everything else is pure thought.
Consistency with the Relational Interpretation
Let us now verify, point by point, that the ontological framework discussed in the previous 
sections is consistent with the relational interpretation:
– The relational interpretation entails that all physical quantities are created 
by observation. This is reﬂ ected in Figure 3, wherein physical quantities are 
represented by the sensory state s of the alter, which arises only from the 
interaction — that is, observation — between ψ and r.
– The relational interpretation asserts that there is no absolute physical world, 
all physical quantities being relational. This is reﬂ ected in Figure 4, wherein 
each alter — as observer — has its own Markov Blanket, which arises from the 
alter’s own interaction with mind-at-large.
– The relational interpretation asserts that no physical system is privileged: all 
physical systems can observe and be observed. Indeed, mind-at-large and all 
alters — that is, all physical systems — can both observe and be observed. The 
extra restriction I imposed pertains only to what constitutes a proper physical 
system to begin with, not to which of them can constitute an observer. The 
fact that mind-at-large and all alters are minded does not privilege them over 
anything else, for according to the proposed framework there is no proper 
physical system that is not minded.
– The relational interpretation asserts that quantum mechanics provides a 
complete and self-consistent scheme of description of the physical world. 
Indeed, since the physical world of an observer consists in the compound state 
of the Markov Blanket associated with that observer, quantum mechanics does 
provide a complete scheme of description of that world. I did suggest earlier that, 
if we could write down the wave function of a human psyche and formalize the 
dynamics of its interaction with ψ, we could solve the measurement problem. 
But this only means that, in practice, we have not yet exhausted the potential 
of the scheme of description provided by quantum mechanics. My suggestion 
does not require hidden variables.
The idealist ontology proposed is thus consistent with the relational interpretation and 
provides an ontological framework for its tenets.
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Solving the Qualms of the Relational Interpretation
We now return to where we started: the philosophical qualms raised by the relational 
interpretation. The goal of this ﬁ nal section is to show that the ontological framework 
proposed in this paper solves those qualms. Point by point:
– The intuition of a shared world: the framework illustrated in Figure 4 shows 
that, even though we do not inhabit the same physical world, we do share a 
common non-physical environment — namely, mind-at-large. We are all 
alters of one mind, surrounded like islands by the ocean of its thoughts (ψ). 
Although each observer lives in its own physical world, this world is created 
by an interaction — perhaps an interference pattern — between ψ and the 
observer’s own internal state r. Therefore, insofar as the internal state r is 
similar across observers — a reﬂ ection of our common humanity or even of the 
basic characteristics of life that we share with all organisms — such interaction 
should, at least in principle, lead to similar worlds.
– The ontological ground of information: according to the proposed framework, 
mind is the sole ontological primitive and ground of all reality. Information 
is thus given by the discernible qualities of experience, which are themselves 
patterns of excitation of mind. The problems of (a) why we cannot mentally 
inﬂ uence the laws of physics and (b) why we cannot directly access each 
other’s thoughts are both solved by positing dissociation to be a primary natural 
phenomenon.
– Relationships without absolutes: there are no such things. According to the 
proposed framework, all physical quantities are relationships between mental 
absolutes. A physical quantity encompassed by the sensory state s of an observer 
consists of a relationship between ψ and the observer’s internal state r (see 
Figure 3 again). So there are absolutes: ψ and r. It is just that, in accord with the 
relational interpretation, these absolutes are not physical quantities.
– The meaning of ‘physical world’: according to the proposed framework, 
the physical world corresponds to the compound state s-a of the respective 
observer’s Markov Blanket.
– The meaning of ‘physical system’: according to the proposed framework, only 
mind-at-large and alters are physical systems. Everything else is just segments 
of these systems’ extrinsic appearances, delineated arbitrarily like ﬁ gures traced 
on tree bark.
Conclusions
I have proposed an idealist framework as ontological underpinning for the relational 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. According to this framework, a universal mind is the 
sole ontological primitive underlying all reality. Physical systems consist of dissociated 
segments of this universal mind, which can observe and be observed by each other. The 
dissociated segments comprise alters immersed in mind-at-large. Alters have internal states 
r, which are quantum superposition states. Mind-at-large has state ψ, which is also a quantum 
superposition state. Alters interact with mind-at-large through mental impingement across 
their respective dissociative boundaries. This interaction is a quantum observation that 
creates the physical world of the alter and causes ψ to become correlated with the alter’s state. 
This way, ψ accrues (Shannon) information about all alters. By arising from interactions with 
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ψ, the physical world of each alter can thus reﬂ ect the presence and actions of all other alters. 
I have referred to these reﬂ ections as the extrinsic appearances of other alters. Living bodies 
are the extrinsic appearances, in our respective physical worlds, of other alters.
The proposed ontological framework solves the philosophical qualms raised by the 
relational interpretation, such as: the intuition that we all share the same external environment, 
the ontological ground of (Shannon) information, the meaning of physical relationships 
in the absence of physical absolutes, the nature of the physical world and the criteria for 
decomposing the world into distinct physical systems.
It is hoped that the combination of the relational interpretation with the idealist framework 
articulated in this paper oﬀ ers a promising avenue to make sense of reality in a parsimonious 
manner, consistent with experimentally conﬁ rmed contextuality.
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